

Reactive Attitudes as a Dialogue of Sentiments

ISRE Pre-Conference

The Social Dimensions of Emotion: New Philosophical Perspectives

Jonas Blatter

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Institute of Philosophy
University of Bern

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UNIVERSITÄT
BERN

I. Reactive Attitudes

II. The Epistemic View

III. A Problem: Forgiveness

IV. The Dialogue View

V. Addressive Emotions

I. Reactive Attitudes

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“... the **non-detached** attitudes and reactions of people directly involved in transactions with each other; [...] such things as **gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings.**” (Strawson, 1962)

I. Reactive Attitudes

“... it matters to us, whether the **actions** of other people—and particularly of some other people—**reflect attitudes** towards us of **goodwill, affection, or esteem** on the one hand or **contempt, indifference, or malevolence** on the other.” (Strawson, 1962)


I. Reactive Attitudes

A Theory of Moral Responsibility


- Overcoming the **free will** debate
- Focus on **interpersonal attitudes** (e.g. anger, resentment)
- Emphasis in other people's **quality of will**
- Ground our **practices** of holding people responsible
 - **Fairness** of gratitude, resentment, hurt etc.

II. The Epistemic View

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II. The Epistemic View



Backward-looking attitude towards an agent and an action that follows broadly **epistemic** standards of appropriateness

III. A Problem: Forgiveness

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Three Fixed Judgements:

- (1) The act in question was **wrong**;
- (2) The wrongdoer can be **expected** not to do such things;
- (3) You, as the one wronged, **ought not to be wronged**.

(Hieronimi, 2001)


III. A Problem: Forgiveness

“To count as **genuine forgiveness**, the abandonment of resentment must not compromise one’s commitment to the three judgments. Forgiveness must be **uncompromising**.” (Hieronymi, 2001)


III. A Problem: Forgiveness

“[...] I think that resentment is best understood as a **protest**. More specifically, *resentment protests a **past action** that **persists as a present threat**.*” (Hieronymi, 2001)

III. A Problem: Forgiveness



III. A Problem: Forgiveness



- What is the **object**?
- What is the **evaluative property**?
- Is this still about **correctness**?

IV. The Dialogue View

IV. The Dialogue View

Analogue to a Conversation:


“[...] the reactive attitude is a response to a distinct stage within the conversation [...] That stage issues from the action or omission of a morally responsible agent [... who] *opens up the possibility of a conversation* about the moral value of her action, and most notably, what it reveals about the quality of her will.”

(McKenna, 2012)

IV. The Dialogue View




IV. The Dialogue View




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Backward- as well as **forward-directed** attitudes that **address** their target with certain **expectations**

V. Addressive Emotions

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A Sketch:

- Appraisal of another **person** and your **social relation**
- Action tendencies directed towards **persons**
- Oriented towards achieving a **social goal** (power, rapport)
- **Satisfaction conditions** that depend on other person's behaviour

V. Addressive Emotions

Anger/Resentment/Indignation:

- **Appraisal:** A wronged B out of envy, hate, uncaring
- **Action Tendencies:** Confrontation, demand apology
- **Social Goal:** Asserting one's rights, social standing
- **Satisfaction:** Admission of guilt, (symbolic) reparation

Fair Blame

Morally appropriate **as a response** to wrongdoing:




- Can it be expected of the target to assent the satisfaction conditions?
- Are the action tendencies a morally acceptable way of treating the target?
- Is the intensity of the response proportional to the severity of the wrongdoing?

Take-Home Points

- RA are **ongoing** attitudes towards a **persisting** person
- RA have **satisfaction** as well as **correctness** conditions
- RA are sensitive to the target's **changing** quality of will
- RA are **(un)fair responses** in the context of social practices

Thank you!

References

-  Hieronimi, P. (2001). Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 62(3), 529–555.
-  McKenna, M. (2012). Directed blame and conversation. *Blame: Its nature and norms*, 119–140.
-  Strawson, P. F. (1962). Freedom and Resentment. *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 48, 187–211.

Morally Required Emotions?

1: If A wronged B then A should apologise to B

2: An apology is only honest if it expresses regret

C: If A wronged B then A should feel regret